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Abstract 
 
The interrelation among economic growth, income inequality, 
and fiscal performance is very complex. The paper provides the 
analysis of the interrelations among these variables jointly by 
the structural VAR methodology, examining also transmission 
channels among them. This approach allows exploring dynamic 
interactions among them and feedback effects on each other. 
The empirical analysis is implemented for the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the UK, the USA, and Canada. We find that income 
inequality has negative effect on economic growth in the case 
of the UK. The effect is positive in the cases of the USA and 
Canada. The increase in income inequality worsens fiscal 
performance for all the countries. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has hit countries and shaken financial systems all over the 
world. This has led to the implementation of large scale fiscal expansionary 
interventions and, as a result, to massively increased public debt issuances in the 
countries. The massive bailouts of the banking system have further burdened fiscal 
balances and rise considerable concern about fiscal solvency of some countries. Many 
governments want to keep deficits under control, but rolling back the expansionary 
measures by cutting spending and raising taxes implies an enormous wealth transfer 
from tax payers to the financial system. The conduct of expansionary fiscal policies also 
implies a huge shift in resources among groups which causes worries about growing 
inequality within countries. Consequently, political instability may follow since people 
perceive such measures as an unfair redistribution of resources. Moreover, the financial 
crisis confirms an on-going trend increase in inequality since the early nineties. 
Increasing inequality within countries has been accompanied by a redistribution of 
economic resources between developed economies and emerging markets.  
Globalization has contributed to reallocation of economic activities to – and increased 
trade with – emerging economies. The breakthrough of IT in industry has spurred the 
demand for more highly skilled labor at the cost of blue collar workers (Baldwin and 
Krugman, 2004). Both trade and technological progress may therefore explain the trend 
changes in inequality. Rising economic inequality raises concerns about the role of the 
welfare state in providing a stable environment for making economic decisions by large 
parts of the population. Growing inequality may undermine political stability. Economic 
growth could start again to be the engine of social promotion. However, calls for more 
redistribution can lead to policies that undermine economic progress and deteriorate 
fiscal performance.  
Inequality creates political conflict, and political structures determine the solution for 
these conflicts. Adequately designed institutions ensure the smooth functioning of 
economic markets. Political stability improves the long-term outlook and enhances 
labor and capital productivity and so rises economic growth. With higher economic 
growth, net gains are positive for all, and political reforms are easier to sustain. This 
may explain why over time in more egalitarian societies there is less demand for 
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redistribution and fiscal performance is better, stimulating greater accumulation of 
capital and higher growth. 
Thus, the interrelations among economic growth, income inequality, and fiscal 
performance are very complex, which are affected through different channels. 
Therefore, in this paper we analyze the interrelations among these variables jointly by 
the structural VAR methodology, examining also transmission channels among them. 
This approach allows us to explore dynamic interactions among them and feedback 
effects on each other. The empirical analysis is implemented for the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the UK, the USA, and Canada, since the economies of these countries are 
generally characterized by comparatively low levels of government regulation and high 
levels of income inequality. Besides, for these countries, there are available relatively 
long and continuous time series for income inequality. We find that income inequality 
has negative effect on economic growth in the case of the UK. The effect is positive in 
the cases of the USA and Canada. The increase in income inequality worsens fiscal 
performance for all the countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses interrelations and channels 
among economic growth, income inequality, and fiscal performance. Section 3 
describes empirical modeling and methodology. The description of the data is provided 
in Section 4. The empirical findings are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 contains 
concluding remarks and policy implications.   
 
2. Interrelation among Economic Growth, Income Inequality, and Fiscal 
Performance 
Since the pioneering contribution by Kuznets (1955), suggesting a non-linear 
relationship between inequality and growth (inequality first increases and later 
decreases during the process of economic development, being known as the “Kuznets 
inverted-U”), there has been a growing interest in analyzing the relationship between 
both variables (Eicher and Turnovsky, 2003). However, theoretical papers as well as 
empirical applications have produced controversial results, and economic theory does 
not have a clear cut answer to the relation between inequality and growth.  
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While a considerable part of the literature has shown that inequality is detrimental to 
growth in the long-run (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Perotti, 1996; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1994), more recent studies (Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou 1998) have 
challenged this result and found a positive effect of inequality on growth in the short-
run. If one can think that both variables are influenced by the same factors, it is likely to 
happen that they are mutually caused. The recent meta-analysis by Dominicis et al. 
(2006) has permitted to conclude that, although policy conclusions are clearly different, 
probably it is misleading to simply speak of a positive or negative relationship between 
income inequality and economic growth when looking at the available studies. In the 
case of the usage of nonparametric estimation methods, Banerjee and Duflo (2000) 
show that changes in inequality in any direction are associated with subsequent lower 
growth rates. 
Differences in estimation methods, data quality, sample coverage, and the initial level of 
income are some of the factors that could affect the estimated impact of income 
inequality on economic growth (Castells-Quintana and Royuela, 2011). The final effect 
also depends on the way fiscal policy responds to inequality. Political debates evolve 
around decisions on spending and taxation, the channels of the redistribution of 
resources, which affect fiscal performance. Depending on the decision about 
government spending and taxation, fiscal policy has different impact on inequality and 
growth. Therefore, fiscal policy is an important transmission channel between income 
inequality and economic growth. In addition to fiscal policy channel, different 
transmission channels between inequality and growth have been specified in the 
literature such as capital market imperfections, fertility, domestic market size, saving, 
and socio-political instability. The validity of the transmission channels and the 
reduced-form relations between inequality and growth have been empirically tested, 
using mainly cross-section and panel data (Ehrhart, 2009; Neves and Silva, 2013). 
 
2.1 Income Inequality and Economic Growth  
In this area of research, one of the mostly studied relations is between income inequality 
and economic growth. Barro (2000) brings evidence of a negative relationship between 
inequality and growth for poor countries and a positive relationship for rich countries. 
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Analogously, Goav and Moav (2004) argue that while income inequality positively 
affects economic growth at the stages of physical capital accumulation, later the process 
is reversed at the stages of human capital accumulation. In addition, it is found out that 
long-run relation between inequality and growth is negative while the short-run effect of 
inequality on growth is positive.  
Exploring the relation between politics and growth through endogenous growth model, 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) find that higher degree of inequality of wealth and income 
leads to the greater rate of taxation (redistribution) and to the lower economic growth. 
That is, the more unequal distribution of resources in society leads to lower rate of 
economic growth, and the link between them is given by redistributive policies. Their 
empirical results show that inequality in land and income is negatively correlated with 
subsequent economic growth. They indicate that the important line of research can be 
the study of dynamic interconnection between income distribution and growth since 
they are consecutively affect each other.    
Alesina and Perotti (1993) explore another transmission channel for the negative 
relation between income inequality and economic growth. They state income inequality 
leads to socio-political instability that creates uncertainty in the politico-economic 
environment, decreasing investment. That is, inequality and investment are negatively 
related whereas the latter is an important factor for growth. Alesina and Perotti (1993) 
test their hypotheses, using a bivariate simultaneous equation model in an index of 
socio-political instability and investment.      
Persson and Tabellini (1994) theoretically model that unequal distribution of income in 
a democratic society produce redistributive economic policies that decrease investment 
and subsequently economic growth. Their empirical results indicate a negative relation 
between initial income inequality and subsequent economic growth. Thus, investment 
could be a link between inequality and growth. Persson and Tabellini (1994) assert that 
the transmission channel of fiscal policy should also be carefully investigated since 
government interventions caused by distributional conflicts lead to decrease in 
investment and consequently to decline in growth. That is, a link between a 
redistribution policy and economic growth should be further explored as well.   
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The study related to the relation between income inequality and economic growth should be 
done, also taking into account that income inequality consists of inequality of 
opportunity and inequality of efforts. While inequality of opportunity has negative 
impact on economic growth, the inequality of efforts leads to economic growth. Since 
they have different impact on economic growth, the overall effect of income inequality 
on it depends on what component prevails (Marrero and Rodriguez, 2010). However, to 
explicitly test it, it is still a challenge because the data on inequality of opportunity are 
very limited. One of the recent developments in this area is the calculation of Human 
Opportunity Index by the World Bank (Ferreira, 2012), and it is mainly applied for 
Latin American countries. With the availability of data on inequality of opportunity, it 
can be explicitly included in the model and tested its influence on economic growth.  
 
2.2 Income Inequality and Fiscal Performance 
Economic recessions accompanied with high inequality lead to political pressure, which 
causes discretionary government spending. The various groups of a country may try to 
change established inequality through public spending during recessions. Lower income 
groups demand more transfers while groups with higher incomes want to obtain tax 
benefits through lighter taxation. The redistribution is influenced by the relative power 
of each group in the political decision making process Milanovic (1999). In the long 
run, this conflict can lead to excessive debt if the government pays for these transfers to 
certain groups without taxing others. In the short term, an economic boom increases 
government income, making easier to pay more transfers to all groups while in a 
recession the government with lower disposal income prefers to borrow or raise taxes to 
ease tensions in the groups.  
Larch (2010) argues that fiscal performance is influenced by the different degrees of 
income inequality. In particular, he shows that countries with higher degree of income 
inequality are prone to run deficits and accumulate government debt. To explain fiscal 
performance, Larch (2010) uses econometric analyses with univariate regression models 
through explanatory variables such as income inequality and economic growth, which is 
risky since they are not exogenous, and there is a problem of endogeneity, causality 
between dependent and independent variables.    
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2.3 Fiscal Performance and Economic Growth 
Fiscal performance reflects fiscal policy discipline, and it is significantly affected by the 
volatility of fiscal policy. As shown by Woo (2011), income inequality leads to the 
volatility of fiscal policy, which in turn dampens economic growth. That is, he discusses 
the fiscal policy volatility channel for the negative link between inequality and growth. 
Woo (2011) considers this channel by separately examining the links between income 
inequality and fiscal volatility, the latter and growth, and eventually inequality and 
growth. In the work the negative relation between macroeconomic volatility and growth 
has also been considered. The studies of the relations between income inequality and 
economic growth through the fiscal policy volatility channel are conducted by 
univariate econometric modeling techniques. However, we believe, by studying the 
isolated relations among them, we miss important information, and we face the 
endogeneity problem (Woo (2011) tries to address the endogeneity problem through 
instrumental variables regressions). These concerns are addressed by Muinelo-Gallo and 
Roca-Sagales (2013) who examine mutually influential relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth via the fiscal policy channel by considering the systems 
of structural equations. They employ a system of seemingly unrelated regressions and a 
simultaneous regression model in their econometric analysis. The systems of structural 
equations approach to macroeconomic modeling is arguably fundamentally flawed 
(Green, 2002). In contrast, VARs are generally less ambitions macroeconomic modeling 
approach that performs as good as or better than structural equation systems for 
analyzing macroeconomic activity. Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2008), and Roca-Sagales 
and Sala (2011) employ also VAR modeling approach. However, they mainly focus on 
the examinations of the fiscal policy effects on GDP while we will directly explore the 
interrelations among growth, inequality, and fiscal performance.  
To show the interrelations among the discussed variables, we draw a diagram, which is 
presented in Figure 1 in Appendix1. From the diagram, we can see the complex mutual 
interrelations among the variables. Some of the isolated interrelations among them have 
been extensively studied in the literature. The aim of this paper is to study and analyze 
those interrelations jointly.    
 
                                                          
1All the figures and the tables of the paper are provided in Appendix. 
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3. Empirical Modeling and Methodology 
Considering the current state of this research area, we explore the interrelations among 
economic growth, income inequality, and fiscal performance jointly through structural 
VAR modeling, taking also into account transmission channels among them. This 
approach allows us to tackle the endogeneity problem among the variables and to study 
the considered variables in a system. In addition, it also allows us to examine dynamic 
interactions among them and feedback effects on each other through impulse response 
functions and variance decompositions.    
 
3.1 VAR Models 
In general, a VAR model of order p, denoted VAR(p), can be expressed as: 
 (1) 
where  is  vector containing each of the variables included in the VAR;  is 
an  vector of intercept terms;  are  matrices of coefficients; and  is 
an  vector of error terms. Nevertheless, any VAR(p) can be rewritten as a 
VAR(1), which is known as the companion form of the VAR(p).  
It is assumed that the vector of error terms is a n-dimensional white noise process, i.e., 
 and  for , where  is a  symmetric 
positive definite matrix. Since error terms are serially uncorrelated with constant 
variances and the right hand side of the VAR(p) equation (1) contains only 
predetermined variables, each equation in the system can be estimated by OLS. 
Moreover, these estimates are consistent and asymptotically efficient (Enders, 1995). 
This is true not only in the case of stationary variables, but also in the case when some 
variables are integrated (Sims et al., 1990). Based on this, some researchers estimate 
VAR models in levels ignoring nonstationarity issues. A drawback of this approach is 
that, while the autoregressive coefficients are estimated consistently, this may not be 
true for other quantities derived from these estimates (Kamps, 2005).Especially, Phillips 
(1998) shows that impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions based 
on the estimation of unrestricted VAR models are inconsistent at long horizons in the 
presence of nonstationary variables. Impulse response analysis is one of the main tools 
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for policy analysis in the case of VAR models and it is widely used in the paper. 
Therefore, we employ only stationary series for estimations in the current research 
work. 
 
3.2 Structural VAR Models 
Little can be learned about the underlying economic structure of the aforementioned 
VAR models in their standard forms unless identifying restrictions are imposed since 
these models are reduced form models. The shocks of this reduced form model are not 
generally economically meaningful because they are linear combinations of structural 
shocks. The underlying structural model is obtained by pre-multiplying both sides of the 
unrestricted VAR by the  matrix:  
 (2) 
where  for  and , which describes the relation between the 
structural disturbances  and the reduced form disturbances  (or equivalently 
). It is assumed that the structural disturbances  are white noise and 
uncorrelated with each other, i.e., their variance-covariance matrix is diagonal. The 
matrix  describes the contemporaneous relation among the variables contained in the 
vector .That is, there are more parameters in the structural model (2) than in the 
reduced form VAR presented in (1). Therefore, without restrictions on the parameters of 
the structural model, it is not identified. There are number of alternative identification 
procedures proposed in the literature. In this empirical work, we apply the widely used 
recursive approach originally proposed by Sims (1980) that restricts  (and 
correspondingly ) to a lower triangular matrix. That is, this identification scheme, 
also known as Cholesky decomposition, imposes a recursive causal structure from the 
top variables to the bottom variables. While this recursive approach enables to uniquely 
identify the structural VAR model, it has  possible orderings in total. Though 
economic reasoning usually allows selecting an appropriate ordering, the sensitivity of 
the dynamic properties of the model to alternative orderings of the variables should be 
checked.  
 
 
10 
 
3.3 Impulse Response Functions 
Impulse response functions (IRFs) are intuitive tools to analyze interactions among 
variables in VAR models. To see this and keep things simple, we can consider the case 
of VAR(1) without loss of generality since any VAR(p) can be rewritten as a VAR(1). 
Firstly we need to express it in its vector moving average (VMA) representation by 
using recursive substitution: 
 
(3) 
To trace the economic impact of an impulse to one of the variables on itself and on the 
rest of the variables in the system, it is required the VMA representation based on the 
orthogonal structural shocks instead of the reduced form disturbances, which are 
correlated with each other. Therefore, by using the expression for the reduced form 
disturbances , we rewrite (3) as: 
 
(4) 
It can be written in a more compact form as: 
 
(5) 
By updating this equation, we get the responses of to one unit impulse at time . If 
we graph each element of against periods, we obtain the response of each variable in 
the system from the impulse to the different structural shocks. Thus, IRFs describe how 
the VAR system reacts over time to one unit shock in a variable assuming that there is 
no other shock in the system during that period. 
 
3.4 Variance Decomposition 
Another type of analysis which is usually done with structural VAR models is the 
variance decomposition. It allows decomposing the total variance of a time series into 
the percentages attributable to structural shocks, which are orthogonal and have unit 
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variances. As discussed above, an identified structural VAR can be expressed through 
the VMA representation:  
 (6) 
where  is a polynomial in lag operators. The variance of  is given by 
 
(7) 
where  is the variance of  generated by the th shock. This implies that 
 
(8) 
is the percentage of the variance of  explained by the th shock. It is also possible to 
study the variance of a variable explained by a structural shock at a given horizon. The 
percentage of the variance of  due to the th shock at horizon  is given by 
 
(9) 
Thus, the variance decomposition analysis enables to decompose the total variance of a 
time series into the percentages attributable to each structural shock. 
 
4. Data 
4.1 The Choice of the Countries 
The empirical analysis is implemented for the Anglo-Saxon countries, the UK, the 
USA, and Canada. The economies of these countries are generally characterized by the 
low levels of the government regulation, the small shares of the public sector, and by 
free markets. While the Anglo-Saxon economic model might foster innovations and 
competitive advantages, stimulating growth and creating jobs in a country, its impact on 
the overall prosperity in the society is debatable. In particular, it is asserted that this 
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economic model is less redistributive and leads to higher income inequality and poverty 
in Anglo-Saxon countries compared to other developed countries that employ other 
economic models such as Nordic and Continental European models. In this regard, it is 
very interesting to explore the interrelations among economic growth, income 
inequality, and fiscal performance for these Anglo-Saxon countries. 
The UK, the USA, and Canada are relatively homogeneous and similar in backgrounds 
(Atkinson and Leigh, 2013) but they have their specific features. Especially, the UK has 
comparatively higher level of taxation and it spends relatively more on the welfare state. 
Besides, the UK has adopted some social programs used within European continental 
economic models (Putten, 2005).  
The choice of the countries considered in the paper is also conditioned by the 
availability of the data on income inequality. They have relatively long and continuous 
time series for income inequality. This is very important because scarcity and diversity 
of the data on income inequality are one of the major difficulties for empirical analyses 
in this research area. First of all, income inequality datasets generally are not fully 
available for considered periods and shorter than time series usually used in 
macroeconomic analyses (e.g., for economic growth). In addition, income inequality 
can be measured based on gross or net (disposable) income, and the unit of 
measurement can be an individual or a household. Therefore, it is expectable to get 
quite different measures of income inequality, depending on which of these 
classifications are used. Emphasizing this, Knowles (2001) stresses the importance of 
the usage of consistently measured inequality data.  
Due to lack of comparable inequality data, many researchers have to mix different 
classifications of data together. However, Knowles (2001) argues that this is 
inappropriate and shows that the empirical results found in these cases are not robust. 
He also points out that the estimates in the cross-country analysis on inequality and 
growth are highly sensitive to the sample of countries included. In addition, data on 
inequality usually come from different sources, and they are not automatically 
comparable since differences in underlying survey methodologies might impair the 
comparability. Taking all these arguments into account, in the paper we try to use the 
longest possible consistently measured comparable data on income inequality on a 
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country basis. Depending on their availability, we accordingly select the same ranges 
for the other time series used in the empirical analysis.    
 
4.2 Dataset 
All the data are annual and range over the period from 1960 to 2010.As an income 
inequality measure, we use Gini coefficient (GINI) in our empirical analysis since it 
provides the broadest coverage across time and countries. Gini coefficients are taken 
from UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c, May, 2008, 
OECD, and Eurostat databases. We use these sources for Gini coefficients because by 
far they have the most comprehensive set of income inequality data. In a case when a 
value of a Gini coefficient is missing from a series, its trend is taken (the arithmetic 
average of the previous and next values). When we have to combine income inequality 
data of the same classification but from different sources, we adjust (shift) shorter time 
series towards the longer ones. We use inequality data based on disposable income, 
which are the most appropriate to use in empirical analyses as argued by Knowles 
(2001). Besides, they are mainly the longest available series of income inequality data. 
Data on economic growth (GRGDP) are taken from the World Development Indicators 
of the WB. The time series for economic growth are annual chained indices. Investment 
(KI) and government spending (KG) shares of GDP are from the Penn World Table 
(version 7.1). Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (TAXES) is from Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis (FRED) and OECD. Government net lending/borrowing as a 
percentage of GDP (NLB) is from FRED, OECD, and Eurostat. The detailed definitions of 
the variables are provided in Table 1, and the general statistical characteristics of the 
variables are presented in Table 2.  
 
4.3 Stationary Transformation 
The time series of the variables (except for economic growth) are not stationary 
according to the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. We make stationary 
transformation for the time series before using them in the empirical analysis. Two 
common ways of stationary transformation are differencing and detrending. Depending 
on whether a series is difference or trend stationary, the appropriate method is applied. 
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One of the widely used detrending methods is Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter2 (Hodrick 
and Prescott, 1997), which is a smoothing method to obtain a long-term trend 
component of a series. The HP filter also renders stationary time series that are 
difference stationary and integrated of higher order (King and Rebelo, 1993). Taking 
also into account that all the variables are relative quantities, we detrend the series by 
the HP filter to also provide economic meaning to the variables after their stationary 
transformation. 
For the ratio variables, the detrending is implemented by subtracting the HP filter from 
the actual series. These detrended series show percentage points deviations from their 
long-term means. Besides, these variables are initially given at a point in time in 
contrast to economic growth, which relates to a previous period. Therefore, to provide 
maximal comparability for all of the data for the empirical analysis, the index for 
economic growth is first brought to base (to its starting value for each of the series). 
That results in the nonstationary series. Then, it is also detrended by the HP filter. For 
the base index of economic growth, detrending is carried out by dividing the series by 
the HP filter and subtracting one (all this expression is also multiplied by 100). In this 
case, the detrended series show percentage deviations from their long-term means. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
For each country, the interrelation among economic growth, income inequality, and 
fiscal performance, measured by government net lending/borrowing, are examined by 
the structural VAR methodology. Our VAR specification approach is conditioned on a 
compromise between a parsimonious model and the one that does not have omitted 
variable bias. Therefore, we consider benchmark and extended VAR specifications. The 
benchmark specification that is the most parsimonious and basic one includes economic 
growth, income inequality, and fiscal performance (GRGDP, GINI, NLB). The 
extended model also allows exploring transmission channels among them, and it 
additionally contains government spending, investment, and taxes (KG, KI, GRGDP, 
GINI, TAXES, NLB). 
                                                          
2 The usage of the Hodrick-Prescott filter can be found, for example, in the works by Ball and Mankiw 
(2002), Juillard et al. (2005), and Pytlarczyk (2005).  
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Taking into account the results of the information criteria and the limitations of the 
available time series, we use first-order VAR models, which are estimated by OLS. The 
dynamic interrelations among the variables are studied by the IRFs (ordinary and 
accumulated) and variance decompositions. As described in Section 3, the structural 
shocks, which are considered as one-standard deviations to the variables, are recovered 
and they get their natural economic meaning. They are identified by the Cholesky 
decomposition, which requires to impose the ordering of the variables that describes the 
contemporaneous relations among them. Thus, we need to specify the ordering of the 
variables that has economic reasoning behind it.  
 
5.1 Benchmark Specification 
For the benchmark specification (GRGDP, GINI, NLB), it is natural to assume that 
contemporaneously government net lending/borrowing does not impact economic 
growth and income inequality but it is affected by them. The contemporaneous impact 
of economic growth is not usually distributionally neutral and it affects income 
inequality. On the other hand, growth likely responds to changes in inequality only in 
the long term due to the considerable transmission mechanisms, such as capital 
accumulation (Benabou, 1996, Perotti, 1996, Ramos and Roca-Sagales, 2008). That is, 
economic growth should come first in the model. In any case, we also estimate the VAR 
model and compute IRFs with the reverse order of growth and inequality, but the results 
do not change significantly. Thus, the ordering of the variables for the basic VAR model 
is as follows: GRGDP, GINI, NLB.  
From the IRFs presented in Figure 2, we can see that the structural shock of one 
standard deviation3 in economic growth leads to 0.1percentage points increase in 
income inequality in the case of the UK and to around 0.6and 0.8 percentage points 
declines in income inequality in the cases of the USA and Canada respectively. The 
shock in economic growth results in the rises of government net lending/borrowing by 
approximately 0.7, 1.1, and 1.2 percentage points for the UK, the USA, and Canada 
respectively. While the positive effect of the growth increase on government net 
lending/borrowing is expectable because of the anticipated rise in government revenues, 
                                                          
3As described in Subsection 4.3, all deviations and changes in the variables (after their stationary 
transformation) are in relation to their long-term means. 
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the effect of the growth shock on inequality is not unambiguous as indicated by the 
results4.  
It would not be correct to view the IRFs of inequality to the growth shock in the 
countries through the concept of the Kuznets curve. That would require observing the 
relation between growth and inequality in a country for a longer term. Instead, we 
interpret these IRFs through the disaggregation of economic growth. Based on the 
production function, economic growth could be generally attributable to the growth in 
technology, capital, and labor. So, the impact of the growth shock on inequality could 
depend on the structure of the increase in labor that contributes to the economic growth. 
For instance, if the increased labor consists of many people with low level of income, it 
can reduce inequality due to the earnings of these employees. Thus, for the considered 
countries, the differences in the IRfs of inequality to the growth shock might be due to 
the distinct structures in their labor increases.  
As can be observed from Figure 3 and Table 3, a structural shock to income inequality 
induces to the decline in economic growth (by accumulated 0.2 percent over two 
periods) for the UK and to the increases in growth (by accumulated 0.3 percent over two 
periods) for the USA and Canada. These results underline that the relation between 
inequality and growth is not definite and that is outlined in the literature. The negative 
effect of inequality on growth is asserted in the works such as Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994). The positive effect of inequality on growth for 
the USA and Canada is in line with Barro’s (2000) evidence that this relationship is 
positive for developed countries. In particular, Partridge (2005) shows that inequality 
are positively related to long run growth in the USA, and that is in line with our 
empirical results, which are obtained for the comparatively long time period. The 
differences in these effects for the Anglo-Saxon countries could be explained by the 
distinctions between the UK and Anglo-American economic models. In particular, the 
former probably shares some common features with European continental economic 
models and spends relatively more on the welfare state.  
From Figure 3 and Table 3, we can also see that the rise in inequality generally leads to 
the reduction of government net lending/borrowing in all the countries. In particular, 
                                                          
4The accumulated responses over 2, 5, and 10 periods are presented in the tables after the ordinary IRFs.  
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over two periods it leads to accumulated 0.3, 0.04, and 0.1 percentage points reductions 
in the UK, the USA5, and Canada respectively. These results are congruent with Larch´s 
(2010) work on the negative effect of income inequality on fiscal performance.  
In the case of the variance decomposition analysis, the results for all the countries are 
actually the same (Figures 4-6). The variations of economic growth are not generally 
explained by structural shocks to income inequality and government net 
lending/borrowing. The variance of inequality is a bit more explained by a shock to 
economic growth (around 15 percent in the cases of the UK and the USA). The 
variations in government net lending/borrowing are significantly related to shocks to 
economic growth (about 20 percent for the UK and 60 percent for the USA and Canada) 
while its variation is also influenced by a shock to inequality in the case of the UK 
(approximately 15 percent).     
In general, the estimation results for the baseline VAR model are not very significant, 
and they indicate that there are other variables that influence the dynamics and 
interrelations among economic growth, income inequality, and fiscal performance. 
Therefore, we extend the VAR model by the other variables and we implement the 
empirical analysis also with it.     
 
5.2 Extended Specification 
For the ordering of the variables in the case of the extended VAR model, we mainly 
follow Ramos and Roca-Sagales (2008) since they use a similar VAR model. In 
addition to the considered variables, we also include government spending, investment, 
and taxes in the model. As in the basic case, it is still reasonable to assume that 
contemporaneously government net lending/borrowing does not influence the 
considered variables but it is affected by them. Contemporaneously investment impact 
economic growth (Alesina and Perotti, 1993) and consequently the other variables 
except of government spending, which is planned in advance. Thus, the extended VAR 
model has the following ordering of the variables: KG, KI, GRGDP, GINI, TAXES, 
NLB.  
                                                          
5This result is more obvious for the USA in the case of the extended VAR model. 
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In the cases of shocks to economic growth and income inequality, the IRFs of the 
extended model have almost the same results as in the benchmark scenario (these 
estimation results are available on request). Therefore, we only provide the IRFs in the 
cases of shocks to government spending, investment, and taxes. The IRFs in the cases of 
the growth and inequality shocks are available on request.  
From Figure 7, we can see that a government spending shock decreases economic 
growth by around 1.0, 1.2, and 1.4 percent in the UK, the USA, and Canada 
respectively. That is, we observe the crowding out effect for all the countries. As can be 
seen from Table 4, over two periods the government spending shock decreases income 
inequality by accumulated 0.05 percentage points in the UK but it raises inequality by 
accumulated 0.16 and 0.04 percentage points in the USA and Canada. This result for the 
UK corroborates the corresponding finding provided by Ramos and Roca-Sagales 
(2008). The results for the USA and Canada indicate that government spending does not 
necessarily decrease income inequality since government spending does not include 
transfer payments that specifically directed for the reduction of inequality. However, the 
government spending shock, as expected, reduces government net lending/borrowing in 
all the countries. Especially, as we can notice from Figure 7, it reduces government net 
lending/borrowing by around 0.7, 0.8, and 1.0 percentage points in the UK, the USA, 
and Canada respectively.  
From Figure 8, we can observe that an investment shock boosts economic growth by 
approximately 1.3, 1.0, and 0.5 percent in the UK, the USA, and Canada respectively. It 
raises inequality by nearly 0.05 percentage points in the UK but decreases inequality by 
around 0.05 and 0.1 percentage points in the USA and Canada. The investment shock 
leads to about 0.6, 0.7, and 0.4 percentage points rises in government net 
lending/borrowing in the UK, the USA, and Canada respectively. The economic 
interpretations of these effects of the investment shock are similar to the explanation of 
the impacts of the growth shock due to the direct positive effect of investment on 
economic growth.  
As can be seen from Table 6, over two periods a shock to taxes increases economic 
growth by accumulated 0.2 percent in the UK but it reduces growth by accumulated 0.3 
and 0.4 percent in the USA and Canada. Since taxes include direct as well as indirect 
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taxes, the relation between growth and taxes is not definite as it is indicated by the 
results. Over two periods the shock to taxes raises income inequality by 0.01, 0.01, and 
0.09 percentage points in the UK, the USA, and Canada respectively. That is, the effect 
of indirect (consumption) taxes, which increases inequality (mainly through VAT), 
prevails over the impact of the usually progressive direct taxes, which generally reduce 
inequality. From Figure 9, we can see that the shock to taxes increases government net 
lending/borrowing by approximately 0.9, 0.5, and 0.2  percentage points in the UK, the 
USA, and Canada respectively. As expected, the shock to taxes generally increases 
government net lending/borrowing in the countries.   
For the extended VAR model, the variance decompositions for growth, inequality, and 
fiscal performance due to the structural shocks to these variables follow the similar 
patterns for all the countries (Figures 10-12) as in the benchmark scenario. In addition, 
the variance of economic growth is significantly influenced by a shock to investment 
(around 40, 30, and 20 percent in the cases of the UK, the USA, and Canada 
respectively). This is also the case with a shock to government spending 
(approximately20, 40, and 50 percent for the UK, the USA, and Canada respectively). 
The government spending shock also substantially affects the variations in government 
net lending/borrowing (about 25, 40, and 55 percent for the UK, the USA, and Canada 
respectively). In the case of the UK, the variance of government net lending/borrowing 
is considerably attributable to a shock to taxes too (around 35 percent).  
 
5.3 Robustness Check 
We also implement the robustness check for the estimation results. We carry out it for 
the IRFs in three dimensions. First of all, we try some other alternative orderings for the 
contemporaneous relations among the variables. Then, we use different samples for the 
empirical analysis by using rolling and recursive schemes, and by just excluding the last 
parts of the sample periods since the financial crisis of 2008. Finally, we implement the 
analysis by generalized impulse response functions (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). In all the 
cases, the results do not significantly change. These results of the robustness check are 
available upon request. 
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6. Conclusion  
The empirical analysis for the Anglo-Saxon countries reveals that there are generally 
some differences in the obtained results for the UK, and the USA and Canada. This 
could be explained by the differences between the UK and the Anglo-American 
economic models. With comparatively higher level of taxation and spending on the 
welfare state, the UK probably shares some common features with European continental 
economic models. In particular, income inequality has negative effect on economic 
growth in the case of the UK. The effect is positive in the cases of the USA and Canada. 
Income inequality generally reduces government net lending/borrowing for all the 
countries. Economic growth leads to the increase of income inequality in the case of the 
UK and to the decline of inequality in the cases of the USA and Canada. At the same 
time, economic growth improves government net lending/borrowing in all the countries. 
Government spending leads to the decline in inequality in the UK but to its increase in 
the USA and Canada. In addition, government spending reduces growth through 
crowding out and worsens fiscal performance in all the countries. Consequently, 
government should be careful with its spending policies planned for the reduction of 
inequality. An increase in tax revenues raises income inequality in all the considered 
countries. Taking into account that taxes include direct taxation, which generally 
reduces inequality, and indirect taxation, which increases inequality, we can infer that 
the effect of indirect taxation outweighs. Therefore, government should also consider 
this effect of the increased taxation for the design of its fiscal policies.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Interrelations among the Variables 
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Table 1: The List of Abbreviations and Their Detailed Definitions 
Abbreviation Definition 
GINI Gini coefficient of disposable income inequality 
GRGDP 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 
U.S. dollars. 
KI Investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices 
KG Government consumption share of PPP converted GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices 
TAXES Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP 
NLB General government net lending/ borrowing as percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The General Statistical Characteristics of the Initial Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregate Indices for the Observed Initial Series 
  GINI GRGDP KG KI TAXES NLB 
Countries  Range Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
UK 
1970-
2010 30.32 4.42 2.37 2.32 8.52 1.25 17.17 1.39 34.99 1.57 -3.07 3.00 
USA 
1960-
2010 34.04 2.43 3.14 2.24 9.15 2.27 19.94 2.46 19.98 1.12 -4.34 2.40 
Canada 
1976-
2010 30.11 1.36 2.72 2.15 6.99 0.60 20.95 2.56 33.71 1.92 -3.48 3.63 
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The Benchmark VAR Model 
 
Figure 2: IRFs to a Shock to Economic Growth  
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Table 3: Accumulated IRFs to a Shock to Economic Growth 
 
The UK 
 
 Period GRGDP GINI NLB 
 2  3.200701  0.264858  1.185550 
  (0.43834)  (0.16874)  (0.42286) 
 5  4.830167  0.688883  1.771673 
  (1.31327)  (0.37642)  (1.08221) 
 10  5.158918  0.821640  1.629044 
  (1.92641)  (0.48047)  (1.45428) 
  Note: Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
The USA 
 
 Period GRGDP GINI NLB 
 2  2.619003 -0.202523  1.602130 
  (0.34213)  (0.10866)  (0.28826) 
 5  3.180008 -0.388570  2.129118 
  (0.80303)  (0.18628)  (0.61033) 
 10  3.104505 -0.400607  2.158206 
  (0.89161)  (0.19194)  (0.66540) 
 
 
Canada 
 
 Period GRGDP GINI NLB 
 2  2.972879 -0.102210  1.909500 
  (0.44289)  (0.09874)  (0.40101) 
 5  4.620791 -0.126434  2.851661 
  (1.32961)  (0.18405)  (1.09433) 
 10  5.216965 -0.153955  3.108959 
  (2.09012)  (0.21050)  (1.62067) 
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Figure 3: IRFs to a Shock to Income Inequality  
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Table 4: Accumulated IRFs to a Shock to Income Inequality 
 
The UK 
 Period GRGDP GINI NLB 
 2 -0.200601  0.911916 -0.277761 
  (0.25983)  (0.13270)  (0.40331) 
 5 -0.866653  0.982657 -1.442921 
  (1.06062)  (0.31587)  (0.96317) 
 10 -1.126364  0.834466 -1.732700 
  (1.36811)  (0.35034)  (1.10912) 
 
The USA 
 Period GRGDP GINI NLB 
 2  0.308058  0.614679 -0.036112 
  (0.23974)  (0.09192)  (0.25191) 
 5  0.859454  0.601057  0.133535 
  (0.62547)  (0.14703)  (0.49332) 
 10  0.946704  0.579951  0.184220 
  (0.66669)  (0.14585)  (0.51118) 
 
Canada 
 Period GRGDP GINI NLB 
 2  0.300032  0.477469 -0.152740 
  (0.27035)  (0.08117)  (0.33494) 
 5  0.960148  0.406699 -0.532545 
  (0.98499)  (0.14689)  (0.87702) 
 10  1.011322  0.338410 -0.653779 
  (1.35914)  (0.14498)  (1.11158) 
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Figure 4: Variance Decomposition – the UK 
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Figure 5: Variance Decomposition – the USA 
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Figure 6: Variance Decomposition – Canada 
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The Extended VAR Model 
 
Figure 7: IRFs to a Shock to Government Spending 
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Table 5: Accumulated IRFs to a Shock to Government Spending 
 
The UK 
Period KG GRGDP GINI NLB 
2 0.417666 -1.485402 -0.052830 -1.313866 
 (0.06177) (0.55348) (0.17218) (0.43066) 
5 0.533503 -1.898001 -0.298869 -2.263642 
 (0.16025) (1.32147) (0.35336) (0.98767) 
10 0.497455 -1.921926 -0.410602 -2.214989 
 (0.19119) (1.77646) (0.40276) (1.17329) 
 
 
 
The USA 
 
Period KG GRGDP GINI NLB 
2 0.375167 -1.788564 0.160961 -1.328694 
 (0.04922) (0.37326) (0.10611) (0.28390) 
5 0.390764 -1.572154 0.332754 -1.192997 
 (0.13417) (0.69904) (0.18053) (0.50238) 
10 0.423655 -1.544327 0.305872 -1.144199 
 (0.20065) (0.59874) (0.17540) (0.44023) 
 
 
Canada 
 
Period KG GRGDP GINI NLB 
2 0.262953 -2.423162 0.038953 -1.849514 
 (0.04060) (0.44775) (0.09688) (0.32289) 
5 0.238700 -3.491493 -0.090864 -2.328222 
 (0.10663) (1.18169) (0.17705) (0.83422) 
10 0.170885 -3.189625 0.015043 -1.540005 
 (0.09300) (1.35129) (0.18425) (0.78118) 
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Figure 8: IRFs to a Shock to Investment 
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Table 6: Accumulated IRFs to a Shock to Investment 
 
The UK 
Period KI GRGDP GINI NLB 
 2  0.976506  2.089991  0.137088  0.861668 
  (0.18238)  (0.50155)  (0.17924)  (0.41400) 
 5  1.175426  3.371113  0.436451  1.133473 
  (0.38343)  (1.24859)  (0.34691)  (0.94564) 
 10  1.237162  3.863084  0.526875  1.205034 
  (0.48539)  (1.78924)  (0.41741)  (1.20199) 
 
 
The USA 
 Period KI GRGDP GINI NLB 
 2  0.977815  1.570977 -0.118366  1.246275 
  (0.14694)  (0.28641)  (0.10394)  (0.21694) 
 5  0.672366  1.702047 -0.247252  1.283709 
  (0.31724)  (0.69246)  (0.18463)  (0.49642) 
 10  0.527968  1.446287 -0.184698  1.132109 
  (0.30665)  (0.72930)  (0.21347)  (0.52630) 
 
 
Canada 
Period KI GRGDP GINI NLB 
 2  0.955923  0.423136 -0.216128  0.325310 
  (0.23754)  (0.39695)  (0.10431)  (0.27751) 
 5  0.258630 -1.397022 -0.254878 -1.030792 
  (0.44941)  (1.16279)  (0.17887)  (0.82390) 
 10  0.435789 -1.585301 -0.277969 -0.639629 
  (0.40812)  (1.42195)  (0.20039)  (0.82961) 
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Figure 9: IRFs to a Shock to Taxes 
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Table 7: Accumulated IRFs to a Shock to Taxes 
 
The UK 
Period GRGDP GINI TAXES NLB 
 2  0.211298  0.012955  1.445778  1.575266 
  (0.27662)  (0.09138)  (0.21860)  (0.34619) 
  (0.90196)  (0.26417)  (0.45524)  (0.77530) 
 5  1.076333  0.248470  1.769396  2.303731 
  (1.16556)  (0.32564)  (0.53597)  (0.95182) 
 10  1.686528  0.378987  1.752405  2.277884 
  (1.90557)  (0.44835)  (0.69333)  (1.33621) 
 
 
  The USA 
 Period GRGDP GINI TAXES NLB 
 2 -0.293404  0.010387  0.722265  0.767783 
  (0.18450)  (0.05602)  (0.10190)  (0.15591) 
 5 -1.251813  0.037928  0.633081  0.576080 
  (0.62556)  (0.15491)  (0.24720)  (0.45646) 
 10 -1.007516  0.022178  0.563050  0.737884 
  (0.60279)  (0.16656)  (0.23440)  (0.43322) 
 
 
Canada 
 Period GRGDP GINI TAXES NLB 
 2 -0.440329  0.088826  0.514448 -0.021416 
  (0.23117)  (0.05150)  (0.09482)  (0.22563) 
 5 -1.101992  0.132925  0.378692 -0.690103 
  (0.67492)  (0.09885)  (0.16651)  (0.50037) 
 10 -0.995582  0.111192  0.403685 -0.450146 
  (0.61523)  (0.08789)  (0.14412)  (0.34460) 
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Figure 10: Variance Decomposition – the UK 
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Figure 11: Variance Decomposition – the USA 
 
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GRGDP variance due to KG
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GRGDP variance due to KI
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GRGDP variance due to GRGDP
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GRGDP variance due to GINI
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GRGDP variance due to TAXES
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GRGDP variance due to NLB
-40
0
40
80
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GINI variance due to KG
Percent GINI variance due to NLB Percent NLB variance due to KG
-40
0
40
80
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GINIvariance due to KI
-40
0
40
80
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GINI variance due to GRGDP
-40
0
40
80
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GINIvariance due to GINI
-40
0
40
80
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent GINIvariance due to TAXES
-40
0
40
80
120
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent NLB variance due to KI
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent NLB variance due to GRGDP
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent NLB variance due to GINI
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent NLB variance due to TAXES
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent NLB variance due to NLB
Variance Decomposition ± 2 S.E.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Figure 12: Variance Decomposition – Canada 
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